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INTRODUCTION 
This appeal involves a refusal by the trial court to modify a 
property settlement agreement executed by the parties to this 
appeal and incorporated into a final Decree of Divorce entered on 
January 13, 1977 (R. at 29-31). The settlement agreement was the 
product of extensive negotiation between counsel for the parties 
during the course of the judicial proceeding surrounding the 
divorce action. Appellant claims that during the divorce proceed-
ings counsel for respondent and respondent made a misrepresentation 
to appellant's counsel and, therefore, a modification of the 
settlement agreement and the Decree of Divorce on the basis of 
fraud is appropriate. 
Contrary to plaintiffs assertions, the record in this matter 
uncontrovertedly establishes that (1) the representation in question, 
assuming arguendo that it is fraudulent, constitutes intrinsic 
fraud and is an insufficient basis to set aside the final judgment 
entered January 13, 1977; (2) appellant did not rely upon the 
alleged fraudulent representation and, therefore, as a matter of 
law cannot prove a cause of action for fraud; (3) the representa-
tion in question could not be relied upon as a statement of fact 
since it was merely a statement of the opinion of respondent and 
his attorney and, therefore, appellant cannot prove a cause of 
action for fraud, and; (4) the representation in question was both 
truthful and accurate. 
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By this appeal, appellant seeks assi'stance f th' rom is court . Jr. 
her efforts to set aside the final judgment entered on January ll, 
1977, so she can renegotiate for the second time,!/ a more lucra-
tive settlement agreement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since appellant's recitation of facts is incomplete, and 
therefore misleading, it is necessary for respondent to recount e/ 
pertinent facts relating to this appeal. 
On February 15, 1979 appellant, Terry Lynne Jones, formerly 
known as Terry Lynne McBride (hereinafter sometimes "Mrs. Jones"), 
petitioned the trial court for an order to show cause why the 
Decree of Divorce between the parties entered on January 13, 197i 
should not be modified. The petition (R. at 32-35) was supported 
by the affidavit of Mrs. Jones (R. at 36-39) which alleged that t.; 
division of property made by the court in the final Decree of Dive: 
should be modified since the division of property was founded upor. 
a stipulation between the parties which had been fraudulently 
obtained by respondent, Micheal w. McBride (hereinafter sometimes 
"Mr. McBride").~/ 
1/ As more fully discussed below, an initial settlement agreement 
(R. at 5-6) was set aside by stipulation when appellant retained:, 
present counsel during the divorce proceedings in 1976. 
2/ The affidavit of Mrs. Jones contained no allegatibon th~1f~~ 
Decree of Divorce entered on January 13, 1977 should e mo 
based upon any need of Mrs. Jones. And, at no time during these 
-2-
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The stipulation (R. at 24-26) upon which the January 13, 1977 
oecree of Divorce is founded was the product of extensive negotia-
tion between counsel for the respective parties. It was negotiated 
totally within the context of the adversary proceedings surrounding 
the divorce in question. Indeed, the stipulation ultimately 
executed by the parties was agreed to only after Mrs. Jones retained 
t11e services of her present counsel to aid her in avoiding the 
default to which she had earlier consented (R. at 4) and to aid 
her in avoiding and renegotiating an earlier property settlement 
agreement. (R. at 5-6) 
The action for divorce in this matter was commenced in October 
of 1976 when Mr. McBride filed a complaint (R. at 2-3). Attached 
to the complaint at the time of filing was an "Appearance, Acceptance 
and Waiver" (R. at 4) executed by Mrs. Jones in which she acknowledged 
receipt of the complaint, entered an appearance and consented that 
a default be entered in accordance with the relief prayed for in 
the complaint. The complaint incorporated by reference a property 
settlement agreement by which the parties agreed to distribute all 
assets acquired during marriage. This first property settlement 
was never effectuated in the Decree of Divorce because Mrs. Jones 
proceedings has Mrs. Jones claimed any financial need as the basis 
for l1er petition for modification. Indeed, less than one month 
after the Decree of Divorce at issue was entered, Mrs· Jones remar-
ried obviating any financial assistance from Mr. McBride. 
-3-
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had second thoughts about the provisions of the agreement and 
sought tile advice of independent counsel to represent her during 
the divorce proceeedings and to renegotiate the terms of the 
settlement agreement. Thus, on November 26, 1976 Mrs. Jones, 
through her present counsel Joseph L. Henroid, subrni tted an answer 
and counterclaim (R. at 15-17) which, among other things, withdre·• 
her original consent to default. 
Having been retained by Mrs. Jones, Mr. Henroid and his law 
firm undertook to renegotiate a new property settlement agreement. 
The end-product of those negotiations was the stipulation da~d 
January 13, 1977 (R. at 24-26) which was ultimately incorporated 
into the Decree of Divorce. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the stipulatior. 
provided for the distribution of all of the marital properties to 
the parties and paragraph 7(d), specifically, awarded to Mr. 
McBride "Stock in Land and Cattle Funding" which had been acquire: 
during the period of the marriage. 
After the Decree of Divorce was entered on January 13, 1977, 
two years elapsed before Mrs. Jones filed the petition which give: 
rise to this appeal. The purpose of Mrs. Jones petition was to se: 
aside the stipulation of the parties by which they divided the 
d d · · The petition recited that 
1
: properties acquire uring marriage. 
was "made upon the ground and for the reason that plaintiff [duri:· 
the divorce proceedings] purported to disclose all of his assets 
-4-
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but failed to disclose and withheld the fact that he owned 5,000 
acres located in the northern part of Utah and the southern part of 
salt Lake Counties" (R. at 32). In the affidavit accompanying Mrs. 
Jones' peitition she alleged as follows: 
6. It was represented by the plaintiff to the 
defendant that the properties listed in the 
stipulation and the properties detailed in the 
family trust were all of the properties owned by 
the parties. 
7. Plaintiff failed to disclose all of his assets 
and in particular failed to disclose and withheld 
that fact that he owned an interest in 5,000 acres 
of land located in the northern part of Utah County 
and the southern part of Salt Lake County. (R. at 
37) (Emphasis added.) 
Contrary to the allegations contained in her petition and the 
sworn representations made in her affidavit in support of said 
petition, Mrs. Jones in answer to Plaintiff's First Set of Interro-
gatories admitted that she had been aware of the time of the 
divorce that the parties held an interest in an entity known as 
Alpine Ltd. (which owned the 5,000 acres referred to in the petition 
of Mrs. Jones) but that Mr. HcBride had represented that interest 
to be worthless. (Answer to Interrogatory l(a), R. at 69.) Speci-
fically, in answer to Interrogatory l(a), Mrs. Jones stated that 
Mr. McBride had represented "prior to the divorce that his interest 
in Alpine Ltd. was worthless." Likewise during the course of her 
deposition Mrs. Jones admitted that the basis of her petition 
namely that Mr. McBride had concealed the Alpine Ltd. asset -- was 
-5-
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q 
unfounded since she had always been aware that the parties 
owned, 
interest in the asset (Jones deposition pp. 37-38). She stated, 
however, that at the time of the divorce she believed the parties 
interest in Alpine Ltd. had little value because it had been 
transferred into Land and Cattle Funding and she knew that Land a: 
Cattle Funding was having severe financial difficulty (Jones ~~ 
tion pp. 5-8, 13-15, 37, R. at 246-249, 254-256, 278). 
When Mrs. Jones abandoned the theory alleged in her petitio~ 
that Mr. McBride had concealed the Alpine Ltd. asset, she insteac 
advanced the theory that the value of the asset had been misn~~ 
sented. In a desperate attempt to substantiate this theory she 
looked to correspondence between her counsel Mr. Henroid and Mr. 
James Murphy, who represented Mr. McBride during the course of th: 
divorce proceedings. The entirety of this claim is based upon t>; 
letters between Mr. Henroid and Mr. Murphy. On November 26, 1976, 
Mr. Henroid requested by letter that Mr. Murphy furnish him "wit\ 
list of assets in the trust with the estimated value opposite eac: 
asset. Also list any assets that the parties have outside ~e 
trust" (Jones deposition, exhibit 2, R. at 346). In a letter dat: 
December 6, 1976, Mr. Murphy provided the information which had 
been requested of him (Jones deposition, exhibit 1, R. at 344- 34 i' 
Trie December 6, 1976 letter from Mr. Murphy to Mr. Henroid contai: 
a list of "assets not in trust" which included the following 
-6-
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disclosure: "Stock in Land and Cattle Funding. At this time the 
corporation is in very poor condition and has a negative net 
worth." That representation by Mr. Murphy is the total basis of 
Mrs. Jones' claim that Mr. McBride and his attorney Mr. Murphy 
fraudulently misrepresented the value of the Alpine Ltd. asset. 
Mrs. Jones asserts that since the parties interest in Alpine Ltd. 
had been assigned in 1973 to Land and Cattle Funding, (McBride 
deposition pages 9-11, exhibit 6; Jones deposition pages 9, 13, R. 
at 250, 254), Land and Cattle Funding could not have had a negative 
net worth at the time of the Divorce. The uncontroverted facts 
establish that this assertion is totally without merit. 
In order to understand the nature and value of the interest 
whose worth was allegedly misrepresented it is necessary to review 
the status of three entities -- Geodyne II, Alpine Ltd. and, Land 
and Cattle Funding. Geodyne II, is the general partner in the 
limited partnership Alpine Ltd. In August of 1972 Mr. McBride 
acquired a one-third interest in Geodyne II for $40,000 (McBride 
deposition, p. 64). Geodyne II owned approximately a 50% interest 
in Alpine Ltd. and therefore, McBride's interest in Alpine Ltd. 
through Geodyne II, was approximately 16% (McBride deposition, P· 
64) • 
In May of 1973, Mr. McBride sold a 6% interest in Alpine Ltd. 
to Wendell Hansen for $25,000 (McBride deposition P· 64) • The 
-7-
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remainder of his original 16% interest (10%) was assigned to Land 
and Cattle Funding in December of 1973, (Jones deposition, pp. 
9, 13, R. at 250, 254); McBride deposition, p. 9-12); McBride depo: 
tion, Exhibit 6). 
Land and Cattle Funding was an Idaho corporation whose sole 
stockholders were Mr. McBride and the brother of Mrs. Jones, 
Michael Telford. Mr. McBride's contribution to Land and Cattle 
Funding was valued at $125,000 and the corporate stock which he 
received was allocated to him in accordance with that value (McBrk 
deposition, p. 9-12). From the time the interest in Alpine Ltd. 
was assigned to Land and Cattle Funding it was consistently carriec 
on the books and records of the corporation at $125,000. 
Mrs. Jones' asserts that since the 10% in Alpine Ltd. was an 
asset of Land and Cattle Funding at the time of the divorce, the 
statement contained in Mr. Murphy's letter of December 6, 1976 is a 
misrepresentation. The only support which she has ever offered in 
support of this assertion is that the assets of Alpine Ltd. were 
sold in June of 1978 -- 18 months after the final Decree of Divorce 
3/ for $7,500,000.- She claims if a 10% interest in the assets of 
3/ In footnote 1 of her brief Mrs. Jones states that "Alpine L~· 
did not receive $7.5 million. Approximately $2.5 million is··· 
to be paid to plaintiff as a sales commission." This statement. 
is simply untrue. In February ~978 Mr. McB:r;:ide obtained an opti~:t 
on the assets of Alpine Ltd. which he exercised in order to faci 
-8-
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Alpine Ltd. was worth $750,000 (less liabilities) 18 months after 
the divorce, it had to be worth between $370,000 and $620,000 at 
the time of the divorce (Answer to Plaintiff's Second Set of 
Interrogatories, 2(b), R. at 115). Mrs. Jones offers no evidence 
of the value of the interest at the time of the divorce, but only 
facts and circumstances which existed 18 months after the divorce. 
In her attempts to rely on facts which existed 18 months after 
the final Decree of Divorce, Mrs. Jones totally ignores the facts, 
circumstances and information which were available to the parties 
at the time of the divorce. Facts existing at the time of the 
divorce uncontrovertedly establish the accuracy of Mr. Murphy's 
representation with respect to Land and Cattle Funding. As noted 
above, Mr. McBride paid only $40,000 for his entire 16% interest in 
Alpine Ltd. (McBride deposition, p. 64). He in turn sold 6% one 
year later for $25,000 (Id.) Upon incorporation of Land and Cattle 
Funding, he valued the remaining 10% at $125,000 (McBride deposi-
tion, p. 12). The nature of these transactions offered every 
incentive for Mr. McBride to place as high a value as possible on 
his interest in Alpine Ltd. 
Additional facts available at the time of the divorce demon-
strate the accuracy of the representation with respect to Land and 
a sale of the property at $7.5 million. 
ment was subsequently assigned to Alpine 
Mr. McBride did not and will not receive 
on the sale of the Alpine Ltd. assets. 
-9-
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a commission of $2.5 million 
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Cattle Funding. The business of Land and Cattle Funding was 
primarily agricultural and due to a general recession in agricul-
ture during 1974 Land and Cattle Funding sustained substantial 
operating losses (McBride deposition, p. 16). As a result, Land 
and Cattle Funding was neither able to pay its loans to banks nor 
to pay off other creditors and suppliers. Indeed, the financial 
condition of Land and Cattle Funding was so poor, that in Decembe: 
of 1975, Mrs. Jones brother, Michael Telford, assigned all of the 
stock he owned in Land and Cattle Funding to Mr. McBride and 
abandoned the corporation believing it to be totally insolvent, i;, 
spite of the fact that the corporation still owned the 10% intern 
in Alpine Ltd. (McBride deposition pp. 31-32). Mr. Telford reques: 
no compensation for his stock, but insisted that Mr. McBride assur· 
all debts and obligations of Land and Cattle Funding. Thus, Mr. 
McBride was left with a corporation which had substantial debts, 
which he had personally guaranteed, and little means available in 
the corporation to satisfy the debts. 
During the later part of 1975 and throughout 1976, Mr. McBri: 
attempted to offer Land and Cattle Funding' s interest in Alpine 
Ltd. as security to First Security Bank of Idaho. In all instanc: 
the bank refused to accept the interest as security, considering· 
to be unmarketable and inadequate as security. Mr. McBride also 
attempted to market the interest to private individuals and wu 
-10-
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unsuccessful. The problem being that the interest was not an 
interest in any real property but rather was an interest in the 
profits of the limited partnership (McBride deposition, pp. 73-75). 
In addition to the severe financial difficulties facing Land 
and Cattle Funding, limited partners in Alpine Ltd. began to 
default in the latter months of 1976 raising the possibility that 
the assets of Alpine Ltd. itself would be lost. Thus, at the time 
of the divorce, Mr. McBride owned all of the stock in Land and 
Cattle Funding which was in extremely poor financial condition, the 
only asset of which was an unmarketable interest in the profits of 
a lirntied partnership which itself was facing financial difficulties. 
At the time the final Decree of Divorce was entered between 
these parties no partnership interest in Alpine Ltd. had ever been 
resold by any of the original limited partners, except the interest 
that Mr. McBride sold to Wendell Hansen. In fact, there was no 
market for such interests. However, in June of 1977, five months 
after the divorce, two 6% interests owned by the limited partner 
Pace Industrial were sold. The total sales price for the combined 
12% interest was $160,000, an amount virtually identical to the 
value at which the 10% interest had been carried on the books and 
records of Land and cattle Funding (McBride deposition pp. 74-75) · 
Prior to the time of the final Decree of Divorce there had not been 
-11-
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a single bona fide offer for the purchase of the assets of Al · . Pln: 
Ltd. 
Hence, the record in this matter is totally void of any 
evidence which supports the assertion that the statement "Stock 
Land and Cattle Funding. The corporation is in very poor condit: 
and has a negative net worth" was anything but true and accurate. 
The fact that the assets of Alpine Ltd. were sold 18 months afte: 
the divorce for a price of $7.5 million does not alter the ac~~ 
of the opinion at the time it was given. 
In addition to the evidence which uncontrovertedly establisi, 
that the representations made with respect to Land and Cattle 
Funding and Alpine Ltd. were accurate, Mrs. Jones testified, dur: 
the course of her deposition, that she did not rely upon the 
statement which she now claims to be fraudulent (Jones depositioi. 
pp. 57-58, R. at 298-299). Not only did she testify that she~ 
not rely on the statement but she further testified that it was 
always her belief that the Alpine Ltd. asset had substantial val. 
(Jones deposition pp. 29-30, R. at 270-271). Additionally, s~ 
testified that the reason she did not seek to obtain any of the 
stock in Land and Cattle Funding, even though it contained the 
Alpine Ltd. asset, was she knew, because of her brother's part1c: 
pation in Land and Cattle Funding, that Land and Cattle Funding., 
encumbered with debt lJones deposition p. 44, R. at 285). 
-12-
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Yet, at this time, even though all of the representations made 
by Mr. McBride and his counsel were accurate, and even though Mrs. 
Jones in her own words did not rely on the representation at 
issue, and even though Mr. McBride spent two years satisfying 
creditors and ultimately salvaging an asset of Land and Cattle 
Funding and, even though the factors leading to the appreciation of 
that interest occurred entirely subsequent to the final Decree of 
Divorce, Mrs. Jones boldly seeks to obtain the fruits of the 
efforts which Mr. McBride has undertaken since his divorce from 
her in January 1977. 
ARGUMENT 
The uncontroverted facts in this action conclusively establish 
that the trial court's order of summary judgment was proper and 
must be affirmed by this court. The facts establish, as a matter 
of law, that insufficient grounds exist to set aside the final 
judgment entered on January 13, 1977. Specifically the uncontro-
verted facts establish that (1) even assuming for purposes of 
argument that the representations at issue constitute fraud, such 
representations constitute intrinsic fraud which is an insufficient 
basis to set aside the final Decree of Divorce; (2) Mrs. Jones 
cannot prove a cause of action for fraud because a) she did not 
rely upon any statements which she claims to be fraudulent and bl 
the allegedly fraudulent statements were merely statements of 
opinion and not representations of fact upon which an action for 
-13-
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fraud can be maintained; and, (3) the representations at issue 
were both truthful and accurate given the facts and circumstances 
which existed at the time of the divorce. 
I. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE REPRESENTATIONS 
AT ISSUE WERE INACCURATE OR FRAUDULENT, 
SUCH REPRESENTATIONS CONSTITUTE INTRINSIC 
FRAUD FROM WHICH APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO 
NO RELIEF FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE 
DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED JANUARY 13, 1977. 
The Decree of Divorce entered by this court on January 13, 
1977 constitutes a final judgment, Sorenson v. Sorenson, 438 P.2d 
180 (Utah 1968), which may not be upset upon the ground of fraud 
if the alleged fraudulent representation constitutes what courts 
have defined as intrinsic fraud. In those cases in which courts 
have addressed the issue of whether a final judgment should be 
set aside or modified on the ground of fraud, they have unanimous~: 
distinquished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud. In so 
distinquishing, the courts have unanimously held that only in 
instances of extrinsic fraud is a claimant entitled to relief. 
Clissold v. Clissold, 519 P.2d 241 (Utah 1974); Haner v. Haner, 
373 P.2d 577 (Utah 1962); Glover v. Glover, 242 P.2d 298 (Utah 
1952); Rice v. Rice, 212 P.2d 685 (Utah 1949). 
In Clissold, supra, this Court, relying on the distinction 
between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, denied a former wife's 
motion to modify the property settlement aspects of the Decreeoi 
-14-
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Divorce. The movant in Clissold sought to set aside the final 
judgment on the ground of fraud asserting that an interrogatory 
had been falsely answered. After recognizing that in certain 
instances fraudulent misrepresentations may provide a basis for 
setting aside a final divorce decree, the court stated: 
... however, before relief can be granted, it must be 
determined that the alleged misrepresentation or conceal-
ment constitutes conduct, such as fraud, as would basically 
afford the complaining party relief from the judgment. The 
proper disposition of this case requires an analysis and 
discussion of the concepts of "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" 
fraud. The public interest requires that there be an end 
to litigation. To accomplish this objective the courts 
have always distinquished between the actions of a party 
litigant which bear upon the opposing party's opportunity 
for a fair submission of his case and a party's misrepre-
sentation during trial. Those actions asserted to be 
fraudulent which prevent a fair submission of the contro-
versy such as deceiving a party into not filing an answer 
or deceiving a party into staying away from court on the 
day of the trial are classed as extrinsic fraud, and if 
existent in fact, entitle the opposing party to relief 
from the judgment. Conduct asserted to be fraudulent 
which occurs during the course of the proceedings, such 
as false testimony, whether or not existent in fact, does 
not entitle a party to relief from the judgment. The 
principal, of course, is that during a trial veracity 
itself is on trial, and in the public interest cannot be 
tried again. Some exceptions to this rule exist in 
divorce cases where there has been a gross misrepre-
sentation of assets by a party. Such does not appear 
in the case at bar. At most there was a dispute as 
to the value of some highly speculative property and 
an answer to an interrogatory, even if untrue, would 
be no different than a false answer during trial, and 
would therefore come within the classification of 
intrinsic fraud, not entitling the opposing party to the 
relief. 559 P.2d at 242 (Emphasis original, except last 
sentence) • 
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Similarly, in Haner, supra this court faced the same issues 
and again refused to reverse the trial court's refusal to modify: 
decree of divorce because the fraud alleged was intrinsic fra~. 
In Haner the court discussed the issues as follows: 
It is sometimes said that when a judgment is attacked colla-
terally on the ground that it was obtained by fraud or 
deceit it will be set aside only for extrinsic fraud. But 
we are in accord with the indications in the restatement 
of judgments that this is too limited. It seems more 
realistic to say that when it appears that the process of 
justice has been so completely thwarted or distorted as 
to persuade the court that in fairness and good conscience 
the judgment should not be permitted to stand, relief 
should be granted. However, inasmuch as the plaintiff 
here seems to be relying on the ground as fraud, there 
is a distinction which it is necessary to point out. 
In order to justify granting relief, the alleged wrong 
would have to be of the type characterized as extrinsic 
fraud: that is, fraud based on conduct or activities 
outside of the court proceedings themselves; and which 
is designed and has the effect of depriving the other 
party of the opportunity to present his claim or defense. 
This type of fraud which is regarded as a fraud not only 
upon the opponent, but upon the court itself, can be 
accomplished in a number of ways, such as making false 
statements or representations to the other party or to 
witnesses to prevent them from contesting the issues; 
or by that means or otherwise preventing the attendance . 
of the parties for witnesses; or by destroying or secreting 
evidence; so that a fair trial of the issues is effectiveU 
prevented. 
It is obvious that quite a different situation where there 
is no prevention of the party from contesting the issues 
in a trial and where the complaint is simply that one 
party pres~nted prejured testimony or false eviden7e. 
This charge is simply a continuation of the s~me dispute 
which the trial was supposed to resolve. It is the purpose 
of the law to afford the parties full opportunity to have 
themselves and their witnesses present; and to present theH 
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evidence and their contentions to the court. When this has 
been done and the court has made its determination, that 
should end the matter, except for the right of appeal. It 
is so patent as to hardly justify comment that a judgment 
should not be set aside merely to grant the losing party 
another chance to accomplish the task at which he just 
failed: to prove that he was right and the opponent was 
wrong. To reopen a case just because a party persists 
in asserting and attempting to prove that his version 
of the dispute was the truth and that of the opponent 
was false would open the door to a repetition of that 
procedure, whoever won the next time; and thus to 
keeping the dispute going ad infinitum with no way 
of determing when the merry-go-round of the lawsuit 
would end. This would involve not only a waste of 
time, energy and expense but also would result in 
such uncertainty as to the peoples right that the 
very purpose of the lawsuit, the settling of disputes 
and putting them at rest, would be defeated. Resort 
to the courts would be frustrating and unpractical 
unless there were some point at which decisions become 
final so that the parties can place reliance thereon, 
leave their troubles behind and proceed to the future. 
It is for these reasons that courts accord to judgments 
regularly entered a high degree of sanctity; and would 
overturn a judgment such as the instant one on the 
ground of fraud only if it were shown that the complain-
ing party had been wrongfully deprived of the opportunity 
to meet and contest the issues at the trial. 
The averment set out in plaintiff's affidavit are to 
the effect that the defendant has, since the trial, 
admitted the accusations made in his pleadings and 
at the trial concerning her associations with other 
men were not true; and that erroneous values were 
placed on some of their properties. Inasmuch as 
the parties and their witnesses were present and these 
issues were contested during the trial, if there were 
in fact misrepresentations and fraud, as plaintiffs claim, 
they would have occured within the trial itself (thus 
intrinsic to it) and therefore would not have been 
the type of fraud characterized as extrinsic fraud, 
explained above. In view of the principles herein 
discussed, the trial court correctly rules that 
plaintiff's charges would provide no basis upon which 
to set aside judgment. 373 P.2d at 578-579. 
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The issues presented by the petition of Mrs. Jones and the 
facts alleged are virtually identical to those addressed by ~~ 
court in both Clissold and Haner. However, the alleged misrepre· 
sentation in this instance is not in the form of a false answer to 
an interrogatory as in the Clissold case, nor it is an admittedly 
false representation in a pleading as in the Haner case; rather it 
is merely a statement of opinion contained in a letter exchanged 
between counsel. Appellant argues that even though one is not 
entitled to relief from fraudulent representations contained in 
answers to interrogatories nor from fraudulent statements contair.E' 
in other pleadings, one is, nevertheless, entitled to relief if 
information contained in a letter between counsel appears inaccura· 
in the light of circumstances existing 18 months later. 
It is untenable to argue, as appellant does that because the 
representations at issue were contained in a letter between couns• 
rather than in a formal pleading, the alleged misrepresentation is 
transformed from intrinsic fraud into extrinsic fraud. The 
letters at issue herein were exchanged between counsel during the 
course of the adversary and judicial proceeding surrounding the 
divorce between the parties and were as intrinsic to those procee'. 
ings as any interrogatory or other pleading exchanged between 
counsel. To allow appellant to set aside the final judgment in 
this matter would be an incentive to counsel to seek discovery by 
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informal means rather than formal pleading, as a method of avoid-
ing finality of judgments. The fact that appellants counsel 
choose to proceed by letter rather than by formal interrogatory 
should not allow her to avoid the finality of the judgment in 
question. 
Appellant's reliance on Glover v. Glover, 242 P.2d 298 (Utah 
1952) in support of her contention that the alleged fraud in this 
case was extrinsic, is misplaced. In Glover, the plaintiff was 
induced not to seek a distribution of certain property in the 
divorce decree, and did not bring certain property to the court's 
attention because of her reliance on a private agreement which 
defendant had no intention of keeping. This Court determined that 
the "false promise of a compromise" constituted extrinsic fraud. 
242 P.2d at 300. 
In this case no false promise of a compromise exists. The 
asset in question stock in Land and Cattle Funding -- was dis-
closed and contested. Mrs. Jones, with the aid of her counsel, 
had every opportunity to examine the validity of the opinion of 
Mr. McBride and his cou:csel with respect to Land and Cattle Fund-
ing; and, thus, had ample opportunity to litigate the matters 
which she now raises. Indeed, neither Mr. McBride nor his counsel 
made any statement which deprived Mrs. Jones of the opportunity to 
contest the matters which she now wishes to litigate years after 
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they were laid to rest. Hrs. Jones, of her own volition, choose 
not to litigate in January of 1977 because, in her own words, 
Mr. McBride agreed in the stipulation at issue to give her "every-
thing which she requested" (Jones deposition pp. 84-85, R. at 3& 
326). 
The fact that appellant's counsel saw fit not to ask a 
single interrogatory, nor request a single document via Rule 34 0: 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nor to take a single deposihor 
must not be allowed as a means of circumventing the finality of 
the Decree of Divorce. The letters and negotiations between 
counsel for the respective parties were instrinsic to the judicia: 
proceedings surrounding the divorce and, thus, do not constitute: 
sufficient basis to set aside the final Decree of Divorce. This 
Court's conclusion in Clissold, supra, is dispositive, 
At most there was a dispute as to the value of some 
highly speculative property, and an answer to an inter-
rogatory [or information contained in a letter exchanged 
between counsel], even if untrue, would be no different 
than a false answer during trial, and would therefore 
come within the classification of intrinsic fraud, not 
entitling the opposing party to relief. 592 P.2d at 
242. 
Hence, the trial court's order of summary judgment must be 
affirmed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MUST BE AFFIRMED SINCE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
APPELLANT CANNOT PROVE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
FRAUD. 
This court has on a number of occasions enumerated the 
elements which must be proven in order to establish a cause of 
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action for fraud. The elements are as follows: 
L That the representation was made. 
2. That the reeresentation concerned an existing: material 
~ 
3. That the representation was false. 
4. That the person making the representation knew it to be 
false. 
5. That the representation was made to induce action. 
6. That the other party acted on the representation reasonably 
and in ignorance of its falsity. 
7. That the other party did in fact rely on the statement. 
8. That he was induced to act. 
9. That he thereby suffered injury and damage. 
Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952); Stuck v. Delta Land 
& Water Company, 227 P.2d 291 (1924). If a claimant fails to 
establish any one of the elements identifed above, the cause of 
action for fraud must fail. 
In this instance, Mrs. Jones cannot establish two essential 
elements. First, by her own testimony she did not rely upon the 
statements which she alleges to be fraudulent. Second, the repre-
sentations at issue were merely statements of opinion and as such 
were not representations of fact sufficient to support an action 
for fraud. 
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A. Assuming respondents representations with 
:espect to Land and Cattle Funding were 
inaccurate, appellant cannot prove a cause 
of action for fraud because she did not 
rely upon the representations made by 
respondent. 
The testimony of Mrs. Jones conclusively demonstrates that 
her action for fraud must fail as a matter of law. By her own 
testimony she did not rely upon the statements which she alleges 
to be false. The following testimony taken from her deposition 1: 
conclusive: 
Question: At the time you decided not to take any stock 
in Land and Cattle Funding did you rely on the statement 
that the corporation had a negative net worth? 
Answer: No, I did not rely on that statement. 
Question: Did you rely on your counsel? 
Answer: As far as Land and Cattle Funding was concerned, 
it was a joint I decided I didn't want that. 
* * * 
Question: Did you read this document [December 6th 
letter from Mr. Murphy to Mr. Henroid] and see the 
statement, "the corporation has a negative net worth," 
and as a result of reading this statement say "I don't 
want any of that stock"? 
Answer: Not as a result of just that, no. 
(Jones deposition, p. 57-58, R. at 298-299). 
Thus, it is clear from the testimony of Mrs. Jones, herself, 
that she cannot substantiate an action for fraud because there wa: 
simply no reliance by her on the alleged fraudulent statement. 
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In addition to her own testimony the facts in this record 
demonstrate that there was simply no reliance by Mrs. Jones upon 
any representation made by Mr. McBride or his counsel. Indeed, it 
was because Mrs. Jones did not believe she could rely upon Mr. 
McBride that she retained the services of her present counsel to 
set aside and renegotiate the original property settlement agree-
ment which she executed. 
Since appellant did not rely upon the representations at 
issue, she cannot, as a matter of law, prove an action for fraud 
and, therefore the trial court's order of swnmary judgment must be 
affirmed. 
B. Appellant cannot maintain an action 
for fraud based upon the representa-
tions at issue since they were merely 
statements of respondent's opinions 
and were not representations of fact. 
In his letter to Mr. Murphy of December 26, 1976, Mr. Henroid 
requested that he be furnished "with a list of assets in trust and 
their estimated values" and with a "list of assets not in trust." 
With respect to the assets not in trust Mr. Henroid did not even 
request an opinion as to their value. However, since Mr. Henroid 
had requested opinions as to the value of the assets held in 
trust, Mr. McBride and his counsel also provided, in the letter of 
December 6, 1976, opinions with respect to the assets not held in 
trust. The statement contained in the December 6, 1976 letter 
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from Mr. Murphy to Mr. Henroid to the effect that Land and Cattle 
Funding was in very poor condition and had a negative net worth 
constitutes nothing more than the opinion of Mr. McBride and his 
counsel as to what they believed the value of that stock to be at 
the date in question. 
This court has held in Oberg v. Saunders, 184 P. 2d 229 (Utah 
1947) that "representations as to value are expressions of opinior. 
and cannot form the basis of an action fraud. 184 P. 2d at 234. 
Similarly in Davis v. Schiess, 417 P.2d 19 (Wyo. 1966) the Wyomin~ 
Supreme Court held: 
Since the early days of this court, it has followed the 
general rule that an expression of opinion as to value 
is not fraud. Otherwise stated a statement which is 
but an opinion is generally not held to be a represen-
tation of fact. . . . an honest opinion as to value is 
not a fraudulent misrepresentation. 417 P.2d at 291. 
In his letter of November 26 Mr. Henroid asked for nothing 
more than Mr. McBride's estimates or opinions as to the value of 
certain assets; and, in light of the circumstances which existed a: 
the time, Mr. McBride provided what he believed to be honest and 
fair opinions as to the values of the respective assets. Given 
the severe financial troubles which afflicted Land and Cattle 
Funding during the entire divorce proceedings, it is untenable to 
even suggest that Mr. McBride misrepresented the viability of the 
corporation or the financial hardship which Land and Cattle Fundir 
was encountering. In short, the representation made by Mr. McBrk 
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and his counsel with respect to the financial status of Land and 
cattle Funding was a totally accurate and truthful representation 
of their opinion as to the corporation's financial status. 
However, regardless of the accuracy of the opinions in 
question, they were just that -- opinions. As such, they were 
not statements of fact sufficient to support an action for fraud, 
or. and, therefore, the trial court's order of summary judgment must 
:o 
!if. 
be affirmed. 
III. THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS IN THIS RECORD 
CONCLUSIVELY DEMONSTRATE THAT MR. McBRIDE 
COMMITTED NO FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION OF 
FACT, NOR ANY KNOWING CONCEALMENT OF FACT, 
BECAUSE THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY HIM 
WHICH APPELLANT CLAIMS WAS FRAUDULENT 
WAS IN FACT TRUTHFUL AND ACCURATE 
The entire basis of Mrs. Jones' claim for relief in this 
matter is that the following representation contained in the letter 
dated December 6, 1976 from Mr. Murphy to Mr. Henroid constituted 
a fraudulent misrepresentation at the time the parties entered into 
the stipulation for the division of property between them: 
To 
Stock and Land and Cattle Funding. At this time 
the corporation is in very poor condition and 
has a negative net worth. 
the contrary, all of the evidence in the record uncontro-
vertedly establishes that from late 1974 and continuing until well 
after the divorce between these parties, Land and Cattle Funding 
encountered severe financial difficulty which ultimately led to 
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the revocation of its corporate charter. The record is also cl~ 
that the Alpine Ltd. asset owned by Land and Cattle Funding did 
not significantly improve the financial posture of Land and Catti; 
Funding since it was merely a limited partnership interest (not a: 
interest in real property) and as such was unmarketable. Moreove: 
Alpine Ltd. itself was experiencing difficulties due to the def au: 
of its own limited partners. With these circumstances in mind 
there was no reason for Mr. McBride, nor his counsel, to be optirn· 
istic about the value of Land and Cattle Funding. 
Mrs. Jones has asserted repeatedly that the statement "the 
corporation is in very poor condition and has a negative net 
worth" is tantamount to saying Land and Cattle Funding' s interest 
in Alpine Ltd. was worthless. Such an assertion is simply not 
tenable, especially in light of her rep re sen ta ti on by sophisticat; 
counsel. The fact of the matter is that at the time of the divor: 
Mr. McBride did not own a 10% interest in the real property owned 
by Alpine Ltd. He owned stock in Land and Cattle Funding which 
owned a 10% limited partnership interest in Alpine Ltd. The 
stock of Land and Cattle Funding was of little value because ~e 
liabilities and potential liabilities of the corporation were 
greater than the value which Mr. McBride believed the assets 
of Land and cattle Funding represented. Moreover, since Mr. 
McBride had been unsuccessful in selling the 10% limited partner· 
ship interest he had no reason to believe that it added signi-
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ficantly to the net worth of Land and Cattle Funding. 
The facts and circumstances which existed at th~ time of the 
divorce clearly demonstrate that the representations made by Mr. 
McBride and his counsel concerning Land and Cattle Funding were 
both truthful and accurate. It is futile for appellant to attempt 
to raise an issue of fact with respect to value of Land and Cattle 
Funding with evidence of facts and circumstances that came into 
existence some 18 months after the final Decree of Divorce was 
entered. This record is totally void of any evidence which indicates 
that Mr. McBride had any reason to believe that Land and Cattle 
Funding, even with its ownership interest in Alpine Ltd., had any 
significant value at the time these parties were divorced. 
In short, the representations at issue were both true and 
accurate, and, therefore, the trial court's order of sununary 
judgment must be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the order of summary judgment 
entered by the trial court must be affirmed. 
DATED this 111/1.day of February, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two true and 
accurate copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief, postage 
prepaid, to Joseph L. Henroid and Earl Jay Peck of and for Nielse 
Henroid, Gottfredson & Peck, 400 Newhouse Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 this 11th day of February, 1980. 
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